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We estimate the impact of geo-located mining concessions on the number of conflict
events recorded in the Democratic Republic of the Congo between 1997 and 2007.
Instrumenting the variable of interest with historical concessions interacted with
changes in international prices of minerals, we unveil an ecological fallacy: whereas
concessions have no effect on the number of conflicts at the territory level (lowest
administrative unit), they do foster violence at the district level (higher administrative
unit). We develop and validate empirically a theoretical model where the incentives of
armed groups to exploit and protect mineral resources explain our empirical findings.
JEL classifications: Q34, O13, Q32, N57.
1. Introduction
Over the last three decades a vast literature has developed around the concept of the
resource curse. The resource curse broadly refers to the paradox that countries rich
in non-renewable natural resources tend to display poor economic performance.1
Conflict plays a prominent role amongst the several channels proposed to explain
this paradox: valuable minerals foster civil wars which negatively affect economic
performance (World Bank, 2011). Yet despite the large body of literature
addressing the nexus, the evidence remains mixed (Blattman and Miguel, 2010;
van der Ploeg, 2011). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) show that countries with larger
shares of primary commodity exports are more likely to experience civil wars.
However, several shortcomings of Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) study have been
..........................................................................................................................................................................
1 Recent contributions to the resource curse literature include van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010),
Haber and Menaldo (2011), Bru¨ckner et al. (2012), Wacziarg (2012).
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highlighted. First, primary commodities are not homogeneous. As emphasized by
specialists of the field, there is an urge to categorize the various types of natural
resources into diffuse resources such as agricultural production, and point
resources such as mineral resources (Le Billon, 2001; Wick and Bulte, 2006),
with the latter being seen as more conflictive (Ross, 2004). On theoretical
grounds, point resources—as opposed to diffuse resources—attract violent entre-
preneurs that compete for the control of the rents (Mehlum et al., 2002).
Recognizing the specificities of mineral resources, a series of papers have sought
to identify the specific effect of mineral resources on civil conflicts. The initial
evidence based on cross-country analyses pointed at the undisputable role played
by mineral resources in both igniting and sustaining civil conflicts (Lujala et al.,
2005; Ross, 2006, 2012; Lujala, 2010).
Second, the relationship between mineral resources and conflict is potentially
endogenous. For instance, mineral resource dependence may be a direct conse-
quence of actual or expected civil war (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008, 2009). The
confounding role of institutions is another source of endogeneity. Fearon and
Laitin (2003) and Fearon (2005) emphasize the role of oil revenues in weakening
state capacity. More recently, Besley and Persson (2010) formalize this argument by
proposing a model of endogenous state capacity formation. They show that natural
resource-rich countries will under-invest in state capacity formation, and will
therefore be more prone to experiencing civil conflicts.
Third, the cross-country nature of the early contributions to this debate fails to
capture the effects of within-country uneven distribution of resources. cross-
country analyses also fail to account for unobserved heterogeneity. For instance,
Cotet and Tsui (2013) show that oil does not affect civil war in a cross-country
estimation, once controlling for country fixed effects. More recent studies adopted
a micro-founded approach by exploiting within-country variations. By working
with sub-national units of analysis, researchers can draw more accurate causal
inference. Buhaug and Rod (2006), Angrist and Kugler (2008), and Dube and
Vargas (2013) all identify a positive effect of the presence of natural resources on
the occurrence of conflict events. Using geo-referenced data at the 100 square
kilometre grid, Buhaug and Rod (2006) find a positive effect of oil and diamond
presence on the likelihood of civil conflict. Both Angrist and Kugler (2008) and
Dube and Vargas (2013) study the impact of exogenous commodity-price shocks
on the level of violence in Colombia. The former show that positive price shocks on
cocaine increased violence at the department level, whereas the latter show that at
the municipality level the effect of oil and coffee price increases have, respectively, a
positive and negative effect on the number of violent events.
Findings from two recent studies by Ziemke (2008) and Sanchez de la Sierra
(2013) on the civil conflicts in Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), respectively, suggest that mineral resources could work as a catalyst for
peace, thus casting doubts on the generalization of the relationship between
resources and conflict. More specifically, these studies, using geo-referenced data,
show that the presence of minerals may contain the level of violence.
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This article enriches the micro-founded literature by focussing on the recent
conflicts in the DRC. More precisely, we estimate the impact of geo-located
granted mining concessions in DRC between January 1997 and December 2007
on the location of conflict events.
The main contribution of this article is to highlight the dramatic consequences of
the level of analysis on the relationship between mineral resources and the
incidence of conflict. By implementing a two-stage least squares estimation at
two geographical levels of analysis, that is, the territory and the district levels, we
unveil an ecological fallacy: although there is no evidence that granted concessions
affect the number of conflict events at the territory level, they increase the frequency
of conflicts at the district level.2
We propose a theoretical mechanism to rationalize these empirical findings,
owing much to the literature on crime displacement (Repetto, 1976; Barr and
Pease, 1990; Brantingham et al., 2012; Johnson et al., 2012).3 In line with
anecdotal evidence, in our model violence affects negatively mining profitability,
thus providing strong incentives for mining companies to keep fighting activities
far from the production sites (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004; Raeymaekers,
2010). This mechanism, which we name the ‘protection effect’, helps explaining the
ecological fallacy: valuable minerals do foster conflict, but not in the immediate
neighbourhood of the mining sites where violence would disrupt the profitability of
the business. Revisiting our econometrics by allowing for a heterogeneous spatial
effect of mining concessions on conflict validates the theoretical findings.
This article, therefore, sheds light on seemingly contradictory findings in the
literature and highlights the role of the spatial dimension in the empirical
literature on conflicts. Our results suggest that valuable minerals do generate
violent conflict, but since fighting tends to be located at some distance from the
mining sites, the relationship can be identified only by choosing a sufficiently large
unit of analysis or by carefully accounting for spatial spillover effects. Failing to do
so may result in a non-significant relationship, as in our study, or even generate
opposite predictions if the ‘‘protection effect’’ is sufficiently strong at the local level.
2. Background
Since 1996 the DRC has experienced a succession of wars and lower scale conflicts
that according to a survey of the International Rescue Committee have been
the cause of more than 5 million deaths over the 1998–2008 period (IRC, 2007)
and an estimated 1.7 million internally displaced people (Internal Displacement
Monitoring Centre, 2011). Whether or not these exact figures are biased
..........................................................................................................................................................................
2 The ecological fallacy refers to the erroneous assumption that relationships between variables at a more
aggregate level imply the same relationships at a less aggregated level. It has also been called a problem of
‘aggregation bias’ or a ‘modifiable area unit problem’ (Wong, 2009).
3 Alternative explanations behind our empirical results are discussed in Section 6.
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(Spiegel and Robinson, 2010), their magnitude is indicative of the lethality of these
conflicts and of the disruptive effect they had on local living conditions (Pellillo,
2012). The causes of the Congo wars are multiple, complex, and intermingled: the
weakness and inefficiency of Mobutu’s regime, ethnic polarization, spillover effects
from the Rwandan genocide, regional control by foreign powers, and natural wealth
have all been listed amongst the key factors (Prunier, 2009; Vlassenroot and
Raeymaekers, 2004).
The first Congolese war (1996–1997) started when Laurent De´sire´ Kabila,
heading the Alliance des Forces De´mocratiques pour la Libe´ration du Congo
(AFDL) and supported by the foreign governments of Rwanda, Uganda, and
other neighbouring countries, contested Mobutu’s leadership. The second
Congolese war (1998–2003) had an even more international dimension because
rival countries and factions saw in the conflict-hit DRC a convenient ground for
waging proxy wars. Although the end of the second war meant a retreat of inter-
national actors from the battlefield, it did not lead to the dissolution of the
numerous rival armed groups and gangs that had formed over the course of the
seven years of war. In fact the violence in DRC continues to affect the country’s
stability, especially in its eastern regions.
Congo’s natural wealth in mineral resources has been consistently blamed as the
main driver of the violence, either as a way to finance warring parties or as a
warfare objective in itself (Congdon Fors and Olsson, 2004; Turner, 2007;
International Alert, 2010; Gambino, 2011; Stearns, 2011). Although Austesserre
(2012) warns about the dangers of focussing exclusively on the role of mineral
exploitation as a cause of violence in the country, it is hardly deniable that many
Congolese mining locations have been looted and the minerals exported illegally
over the years by both Congolese and foreign armed groups (Montague, 2002;
Congdon Fors and Olsson, 2004; Prunier, 2009; Freedman, 2011).
The anecdotal evidence is extensive. Over the years the United Nations has
repeatedly issued reports of experts, of the UN Security Council, and of the UN
Secretary General underscoring that natural resources have shaped and fuelled the
conflicts in DRC. There is evidence that both foreign and Congolese armies were
directly involved in large-scale looting of mineral resources: regular soldiers were
reported to force the mines’ managers to ‘open the coffers and doors. The soldiers
were then ordered to remove the relevant products and load them into vehicles’
(Stearns, 2011). Valuable minerals are reported to have motivated the military
intervention of neighbouring countries such as Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda,
especially after the end of the first Congolese war. Stearns (2011, p.297)
reporting the interview of a pilot highly involved in military and mineral transpor-
tation during the Congolese wars observes how ‘Rwanda’s shifting priorities
[between the security imperative during the first Congolese war and the business
objectives during the second] became clear to [the pilot who was interviewed] in his
flights. He flew their troops into mining areas, where Rwandan commanders would
be in charge of loading tons of tin and coltan [a high-value mineral used in the
manufacturing of electronic devices] into airplanes’.
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The Ituri district provides another good example of the dynamics around the
control of minerals. Three main armed groups were actively contesting the control
of the local gold deposits: the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC), the Front des
Nationalistes et Inte´grationnistes (FNI), and the Forces Arme´es du Peuple
Congolais (FAPC). According to International Alert (2010, p.30), ‘The FAPC and
the FNI clashed over the control of Djalasiga. The UPC held Mongbwalu up until
2003 and were then replaced by the FNI, who were succeeded by the first brigade of
the FARDC [the Congolese Army] to be deployed in Ituri. [. . .] It should be
recalled that in their first deployment in Ituri in 2005, the Congolese Army imme-
diately established itself at the mining sites of Mongbwalu and Bambu, from where
they drove off the local militia by force, with no regard for the local civilian
population.’
3. Baseline analysis
3.1 Data
The empirical analysis is based on the monthly variations of two variables. First, the
dependent variable is the monthly sum of conflict events by territories or districts,
as recorded in the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) (Raleigh
et al., 2010). More than 3,000 conflict events occurred from January 1997 to
December 2007, including 2,627 violent events. Figure 1 shows that most conflict
events are concentrated in Orientale and North and South Kivu provinces, followed
by the territory of Pweto in the Katanga province and Kinshasa. The geographical
dispersion of the data tracks the degree to which various areas of the DRC have
been affected by conflict, thus giving us confidence regarding the data quality. The
relevance of Kinshasa is explained by the strategic and political importance of the
capital city in the Congolese conflicts.
Over time, the evolution of conflict events exhibits large monthly variations.
As illustrated in Fig. 2, several peaks can be observed in May 1997, January
2001, June 2003, November 2005, January 2006, December 2006, and in
particular, August 1998, November 1999, January 2000, and October 2008.
Conflict events occurring after 2007 are not included in our sample due to other
data constraints. The conflict trend based on ACLED data tracks well-documented
increases of violence in DRC reported by secondary literature (see, e.g., Turner,
2007).
We further validate our dependent variable by comparing the distribution of
ACLED conflict events with the number of conflicts recorded in the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP’s) Georeferenced Events Datasets (Sundberg
et al., 2010). The UCDP data adopt a more restrictive definition of conflict
events and only comprise events reporting at least one direct death. Over the
period investigated, there have been 967 conflict events recorded by UCDP
in contrast with 2,627 violent events in the ACLED data set. Despite the
difference of coding, the geographical distribution of UCDP conflict events in
Fig. 3 provides a fairly similar picture to the one depicted in Fig. 1. In one of
j.-f. maystadt et al. 5 of 29
 at K
U
 Leuven U
niversity Library on February 14, 2014
http://oep.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
our robustness checks we show that our main results are qualitatively identical
when using UCDP conflict data.
Second, the main variable of interest relates to the mining concessions. Based on
data provided by the Ministry of Mining (5,549 mining concessions granted over
the period), we construct the monthly sum of mining concessions granted by
territory or district. We will also use the size of these new concessions as an alter-
native proxy. The minerals involved include gold, copper, diamonds, lead, silver,
tin, zinc, palladium, tungsten, and iron ore. There are several types of mining
concessions with different permits and associated fees. Due to sample size limita-
tions, we do not distinguish between the two broad categories: research and ex-
ploitation. The research permit confers to its owner the exclusive right to conduct,
within the scope of which it is established and for the duration of its validity, the
research work of the mineral substances classified as mines for which the permit is
Fig. 1 Distribution of ACLED conflict events in the DRC, 1997–2007
Note: Points represent the raw ACLED events.
Source: Authors’ construction based on ACLED data (Raleigh et al., 2010).
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granted. The permit of exploitation gives its owner the exclusive right to perform,
inside the perimeter on which it is established and for the duration of maximum 30
years, the research, development, construction, and exploitation of minerals for
which the permit is established. A logarithm transformation is applied to the
concession-related variables (adding the value 0.1 when there is no concession)
to ease interpretation, although results are still robust without such transformation.
In our database, concessions were granted in 1968, 1969, 1970, 1986 and between
1994 and 2007. Figure 4 indicates that mining concessions are mainly granted in
eastern and southern DRC, which is consistent with the geological conditions of the
country. Visually comparing Figs 1, 3, and 4 suggests that mining concessions may
be spatially correlated with conflict.
The nature of the relationship studied in this work requires some caution due to
the intrinsic data limitation. First, conflict events may be measured with error. For
instance, it is not unlikely that events in very insecure areas have received little news
coverage, leading to an underestimation of violence in the most affected areas
(Verpoorten, 2012). We run our analysis with the most widely used data set on
African conflicts and validate our results by checking the robustness of our finding
to the adoption of the alternative UCDP dataset. Second, the cadastral mapping of
property rights and mineral concessions may also be inaccurate. This would lead to
measurement errors in the mining concessions data. We cannot exclude, for
instance, that more stable regions feature a more accurate registration of mineral
concessions. The instrumental variables (IV) strategy we employ, described in
details in the next section, partly corrects for this.
Fig. 2 Number of ACLED conflict events in the DRC, 1997–2010)
Source: Authors’ construction based on ACLED (Raleigh et al., 2010).
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Finally, following Miguel et al. (2004), we control for rainfall as a measure for the
climate-induced changes in agricultural income in poorly irrigated countries.
Agriculture is likely to represent the default economic activity for the vast
majority of the population in DRC. Consequently, changes in agricultural
income may affect both the incentives for individuals to join armed groups and
the profitability of mining via the labour market. Rainfall data are measured by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) using a one degree
latitude-longitude grid. We follow a standard approach of transforming rainfall
data into ‘anomalies’, that is, deviations from normal rainfall conditions. More
specifically, the anomalies are computed at the unit of observation (territory or
district) and measure the deviations from the long-term monthly mean, divided by
its monthly long-run standard deviation. A positive (negative) anomaly therefore
signals abnormally high (low) rainfall. The monthly basis is chosen to correct for
Fig. 3 Distribution of UCDP conflict events in the DRC, 1997–2007
Note: Points represent the UCDP events.
Source: Authors’ construction based on UCDP (Sunderg et al., 2012).
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seasonality patterns of rainfall data, whilst the long-run period is defined by the
longest period of available data (1997–2010). We introduce the quadratic term of
rainfall anomalies to allow for a detrimental effect of excessive rainfall deviations as
compared to the normal conditions. Our central results depend neither on the
inclusion of rainfall anomalies nor on its quadratic term.
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of these variables. Given the relatively
long time period used, the non-stationary nature of our variables may be a point of
concern, leading to possible spurious relationships (Maddala and Wu, 1999). We
perform the Fisher panel data unit root test on the dependent and the explanatory
variables (see Table 2). The tests reject the null hypothesis that the series in the
panel contain a unit root. All series are stationary at any reasonable level of
confidence.
Fig. 4 Distribution of mining concessions in the DRC
Source: Authors’ construction based on DRC Ministry of Mining data.
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3.2 Identification strategy
Our analysis exploits monthly (t) and geographical (i) variations in the occurrence
of conflict events (Conflictsi, t) and granting of mining concessions (Concessionsi, t)
between January 1997 and December 2007 to draw causal inference on the role of
new or future mining activities on the level of violence in DRC. The period under
investigation is dictated by data availability, which implies that our analysis is
limited to the incidence of local conflict events rather than on the onset of the
first Congolese war (end of 1996). Using sub-national within-variations, we are
mainly capturing the local dynamics of the relationship between mining conces-
sions and conflicts whilst failing to capture the wider geopolitical dimensions.
Ideally we would like to estimate the following equation:
Conflictsi, t ¼ i þ t þ Concessionsi, t þ i, t ð1Þ
Yet despite the introduction of territory/district fixed effects (i) and a series of
month-year time dummies (t), in estimating eq. (1) we are likely to face severe
endogeneity problems (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008, 2009). In our case, granting
mineral concessions may be highly endogenous because of simultaneity as mining
companies might be less likely to invest in conflict-prone areas, or because of
omitted factors since the granting of concessions may be driven by local politics
that could equally directly influence the occurrence of conflict. In addition, meas-
urement problems for conflict events and in the cadastral data are likely to correlate
with conflict events, thereby introducing additional biases. To deal with these
Table 2 Panel unit root test
Level of Analysis Territory District
Conflict Number 6470.2*** 1489.46***
Violent Conflict 6432.27*** 1503.91***
(Log) Concessions 4390.79*** 1035.36***
Price Index 0.193 0.174
Note: ***p< 0:01.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Territory
...............................................................
District
...............................................................
Variable Obs Mean Min. Max. Obs Mean Min. Max.
Conflicts 19800 0.154 1.024 0 41 5016 0.6064 2.443 0 43
Violent Conflicts 19800 0.133 0.960 0 41 5016 0.524 2.242 0 43
Concessions 19800 0.280 1.756 0 46 5016 1.106 5.467 0 103
Rainfall Anomalies 19800 1.08E-09 0.953 2.77 3.004 5016 3.09E-09 0.916 2.5 2.99
Price Index 19650 506.02 2965.6 0 57774.8 4978 1997.5 7107.3 0 63507.3
Note: The prices of copper, nickel, zinc and lead are not available for one particular month, i.e., April
1998. That explains the slight reduction of observations for the price index compared to other variables.
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methodological challenges, our estimation relies instead on an IV strategy similar to
Bru¨ckner and Ciccone (2010). We exploit historical concessions coupled with
changes in international prices of minerals to assess the causal relationship
between mining concessions and conflict. Historical concessions are defined as
those granted before 1986. Mineral-specific international prices are taken from
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s commodity price
statistics and are normalized.4 A price index is then constructed by interacting the
number of past concessions of mineral j in location i (PastConci, j) with the time-
varying international prices of the mineral j the mining concessions extract or aim at
extracting (Pj, t). The constructed index may be expressed as follows:
5
PriceIndexi, t ¼
X
j
PastConci, jPj, t
The two-stage least squares estimation is implemented at two geographical levels of
analysis, the territory and the district levels. A linear specification is adopted as
non-linear methods in a two-stage framework imply strong specification assump-
tions (Angrist and Krueger, 2001). Accordingly, our estimating equations are the
following:
Conflictsi, t ¼ i þ t þ 1 dConcessionsi, t þ 2Rainfalli, t þ i, t
Concessionsi, t ¼ 0i þ 0t þ 1PriceIndexi, t þ 2Rainfalli, t þ i, t
We add rainfall anomalies (Rainfalli, t) to control for changes in the opportunity
cost to fight that are unrelated to mining concessions. To control for other
unobserved factors, our estimates introduce territory/district fixed effects (i)
and a series of month-year time dummies (t).
The use of time-varying international prices, coupled with historical concessions,
provides an exogenous shock on the probability to grant a new mining concession
of a particular mineral type. The rationale for using international prices as an
exogenous variation is that conflicts in one particular territory or district of the
DRC cannot alone affect the international prices of these minerals.6
Changes in international prices instead do affect the demand for mining con-
cessions: an increase in international prices should increase the attractiveness of
..........................................................................................................................................................................
4 If reported to be traded on different markets in the UNCTAD data set, we select the US market as the
international reference. The prices are normalized to 100 for the first month of 1997. The prices of
copper, nickel, zinc, and lead are not available for April 1998, which explains the slight reduction of
observations for the price index compared to other variables (see Table 1).
5 Notice that similar results are found when the price index is expressed as a proportion, that is, when
PastConci, j is divided by
P
j
PastConcj.
6 The price of coltan is excluded from the construction of the price index to ensure the exogenous nature
of the price index as an instrument. DRC is indeed one of the major coltan producers, producing in 2001
about 4% of the world production (Roskill Information Services, 2002). However, the results remain
unaltered when the price of coltan is included in the price index. In that case, coltan prices are derived
from Roskill Information Services (2002) and the US Geological Survey. We thank Olivier Dagnelie for
sharing that data.
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obtaining a new mining concession, given higher expected revenues. This is par-
ticularly true in areas where concessions of similar minerals have been granted in
the past. The reasons may be related not only to the physical presence of these
minerals but also to the investments needed to exploit these minerals, such as
investments in infrastructure, as well as the local labour market conditions, the
existing contractual arrangements, and so on. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
changes in prices may have an immediate effect on mining exploitation and
demand for concessions.7
Our identification strategy relies on the validity of our instrumental variable.
Although the relevance of that instrument may be directly tested, the exclusion
restriction may be questioned. We assume the constructed price index to be
uncorrelated with the error terms, which implies that this index affects conflicts
exclusively through the contemporaneous granting of concessions. Asserting that
the international prices of minerals are exogenous is a reasonable assumption.
Our exclusion restriction, however, also requires that the unobserved political
discretionary rules affecting the granting of mining concessions are different for the
more recent mining concessions under Laurent De´sire´ Kabila and his son Joseph
(1997–2007) and for the historical concessions granted under Mobutu’s regime.
Notice first the different geographical origin of the leaders (Orientale province for
Mubutu and Katanga province for Kabila) and their ethnic origin (Ngbandi for the
former and Luba for the later), suggesting that the rules of discretion in the
granting of concessions are unlikely to have been the same over the two periods.
Anecdotal evidence on the way mining concessions have been granted in the two
periods seems to support our exclusion restriction. Under Mobutu, the mining
sector was entirely nationalized and mining concessions were largely under the
control of the centralized and authoritarian regime. Mining revenues were used
to ‘fund Mobutu’s patronage network instead of reinvesting earnings into infra-
structure and development’ (Stearns, 2011, p.289). The rules of the game changed
in 1995 when Mobutu allowed his prime minister, Kenga wa Dondo, to gradually
privatize the mining sector. In 1997, ‘the rebellion [led by Laurent-Desire Kabila]
applied its half-Marxist, half-liberal approach to mining, adopting a slipshod policy
that imposed harsh conditions on large foreign companies while favouring shadowy
investors who often lacked the resources and expertise necessary to develop mining
concessions’ (Stearns, 2011, p.290).
Finally, the economic conditions surrounding the mining concessions
experienced important changes between the two periods. In the early years of
Mobutu, characterized by high prices for copper, gold, and cobalt, the mining
sector was the largest source of employment and income in DRC. In the 1990s,
low international prices for key exported minerals coupled with years of misman-
agement dampened the profitability of mining activities. ‘Exports declined from a
..........................................................................................................................................................................
7 For example, The Economist reports how mining companies came from all over the world to deal with
the Governor of Katanga, home to about 5% of the world’s copper and nearly half its cobalt, following
the record rises in prices for these minerals (The Economist, 2011).
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high of 465,000 tons in 1988 to 38,000 tons just before the war, while cobalt
production slipped from 10,000 to 4,000 tons in the same period. Similar trends
affected all other mineral exports’ (Stearns, 2011, p.289).
3.3 Empirical results
In Table 3, we report the results of a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) and the
two-stage least squares estimation as described in the preceding section.8 Notice
first that a naive OLS regression largely underestimates the relationship between
mining concessions and conflict and results in a non-significant negative relation-
ship. The downwards bias suggests that all else equal, mining companies are
looking for locations where conflict is less likely to occur.
Moving to the IV model, at both levels of analysis (territory and district), the
price index appears to be highly relevant: it strongly and positively affects the
probability of granting a mining concession. The F-test on excluded instruments
allows us to unambiguously dismiss the risk of weak instruments. We also use a
just-identified equation, which is known to be approximately unbiased. When we
run our analysis at the territorial level we find no evidence for granted mining
concessions to affect the risk of conflict (regressions (3) and (4) of Table 3). At the
district level, however, the instrumented mining concessions significantly increase
the risk of conflict, and in particular of violent conflicts (regressions (7) to (8) of
Table 3). The magnitude of the effect is substantial: at the district level, given the
mean number of conflict events reported in Table 3, a 10% increase in the number
of mining concessions would increase the likelihood of conflict by about 29%.9
Adopting standard errors clustered at the district/territory level does not affect the
results.
We examine the solidity of these findings by implementing three different sets of
robustness test. All results are condensed in Table 4, where we report only the
coefficient for concessions in the second stage. The first stage (not reported) is
always significant, and all models control for rainfall anomalies, year month fixed
effects, and district/territory fixed effects.
First, we assess the importance of specific locations and conflict periods in es-
tablishing our results. Indeed, our findings may be mainly driven by the very high
concentration of violent events in some territories/districts. A first concern is that
the violence in Kinshasa depicted in Fig. 3 may capture another channel, such as the
strategic value of the capital or the increased state capacity following price-induced
changes in mining revenue. In row A of Table 4 we show that our findings are
robust to the exclusion of the capital district (or the two corresponding territories),
Kinshasa, from the sample. A different concern is that our results are not suffi-
ciently representative of the entire country because they could be driven by the
..........................................................................................................................................................................
8 In the Supplementary Material we provide more parsimonious specifications of both models, without
fixed effects, without rainfall variables.
9 This effect is computed based on regression (7) of Table 3.
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mining-related violence occurring in eastern DRC and in particular in the region of
Kivu (North and South Kivu provinces). We re-run our two-stage fixed effect
estimation, excluding the Kivu region from the sample (see row B of Table 4).
The magnitude of the coefficients is reduced as a consequence of the conflict
intensity in the Kivus, but the significant positive effect obtained at the district
level is confirmed. Mining activities and violence occurring in North and South
Kivu are clearly important to explain the role of mining resources in fuelling
conflict, but the results are also valid for other parts of the country. Our results
are also robust to the exclusion of any individual province from the sample.10 A
related concern is whether the link we identify between mining and conflict
describes the entire period of violence in DRC. Our results in row C of Table 4,
in which we restrict the analysis to the period after the signing of the official peace
agreement in June 2003, suggest that mineral resources continue having a substan-
tial role in shaping violence after the termination of two official Congolese wars.
The second set of robustness checks addresses the validity of the exclusion re-
striction. Beyond the qualitative arguments given in the previous section on the
reasonable nature of our identifying assumption, we alter the sample to assess more
directly the validity of that assumption. One potential concern is that changes in
international prices may revive mining in historical concessions as well, thereby
affecting nearby conflict. This would then constitute a different channel than the
granting of new concessions and it would endanger our exclusion restriction. We
know that concessions are granted for a maximum of 30 years. We therefore check
the robustness of our results to the exclusion of the territory/district affected by the
granting of a concession in 1986 and to limiting the sample to the post-April 2000
period (30 years after the last concession granted in 1970). The results, reported in
rows D and E of Table 4, remain qualitatively identical.
Third, our results are robust to alternative definitions of the main variables of
interest and of the dependent variable (rows F to J of Table 4). First, if we repeat
our estimation using the logged size of the concessions (instead of the number of
concessions), we obtain qualitatively identical results. Second, not proceeding to
the logarithmic transformation of the concessions variable or adopting the alter-
native definition of the mining concessions evaluated on the basis of the year of
demand (instead of the year of granting), does not affect our findings either. As for
the dependent variable, our results are robust to the adoption of the UCDP conflict
database, which records conflict events with at least one death. Similarly, qualita-
tively identical results are obtained when the dependent variable is replaced by a
dummy variable indicating whether the concerned geographical unit records at
least one conflict event for one particular month (consequently using a linear
probability model). Finding similar results with the linear probability model
suggests that the number of mining concessions may also affect the ‘‘extensive
margin’’ of conflicts, following similar mechanisms as the ‘‘intensive margin’’ of
conflicts.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
10 Results provided on request.
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In sum, we find robust evidence that mineral concessions significantly increase
the likelihood of violence at the district level, whilst no evidence is found for such a
link at the territory level. This result constitutes a case of ecological fallacy or
aggregation problem, that is, a misleading assumption that the relationship
observed at an aggregated level (e.g., district) implies the same relationship at a
different level of aggregation (e.g., territory). In the next section, a simple theor-
etical model is geared to explain this puzzling finding.
4. Theoretical framework
We consider a region represented by a unit-length line inhabited by a uniformly
distributed continuum of individuals of unit mass. These individuals are each
endowed with a unit amount of time. We assume without loss of generality that
all concessions are located at the line’s origin. Concessions operating in the region
belong to a mine-extraction company controlled by incumbent i. A challenger c
endeavours taking over the region hosting the mining concessions by violent
Table 4 Robustness checks on the ecological fallacy
Level of analysis Territory
..............................................
District
......................................
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Conflicts Violent
conflicts
Conflicts Violent
conflicts
A: Excluding Kinshasa 0.111 0.0118 1.759** 1.659**
(0.166) (0.138) (0.811) (0.728)
B: Excluding Kivus 0.0402 0.0416 0.142** 0.114*
(0.0442) (0.0432) (0.0647) (0.0603)
C: Sample after June 2003 0.139 0.120 1.529** 1.346**
(0.0858) (0.0791) (0.711) (0.619)
D: Dropping 1986 concessions 0.113 0.0139 1.759** 1.659**
(0.180) (0.150) (0.811) (0.728)
E: Dropping 1986 concessions and
observations before March 2000
0.0426 0.109 1.382* 1.285*
(0.162) (0.141) (0.761) (0.682)
F: Concessions size (log) 7.32e-10 9.36e-11 0.642** 0.601**
(1.16e-09) (9.69e-10) (0.290) (0.260)
G: Demand for concessions 0.825 0.809 1.541** 1.442**
(2.689) (2.296) (0.704) (0.632)
H: Non logged concessions 0.0853 0.0109 0.630* 0.590*
(0.136) (0.113) (0.363) (0.330)
I: Using UCDP conflict data 0.0889 0.885**
(0.0543) (0.361)
J: Conflict dummy (=1 if any 0.0166 0.0185 0.107** 0.117**
conflict event recorded) (0.0462) (0.0432) (0.0475) (0.0486)
Notes: Only the coefficients for concessions in the second-stage regressions are reported. Coefficients of
the instrument of the first-stage regressions are always significant. All regressions control for territory/
district FE, year month FE, rainfall anomalies and square rainfall anomalies. Robust standard errors in
parentheses; ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1.
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means. We model the externality of the ensuing conflict on the mining business as
an increased cost of inputs.
Labour constitutes the unique input of the mining activity, and we assume that
the mining company is a local monopsonist on the labour market. The profits from
controlling the mining concession, , read as follows:
ðxm, dv;AÞ ¼ ’ðxmÞ  ymðxm, dvÞ
 
nxm ð2Þ
where  is the unit return to labour when employed in mining, which we assume
concave in the number of workers active in the mine, xm. The parameter n captures
the number of mining concessions. The workers are remunerated at the
(endogenous) wage of ym. The monopsonist will therefore determine the demand
for mining labour. Individuals specialize in mining or farming. The number of
farmers is denoted by xf ¼ 1  xm. The farming activity yields an income yf.
Mining is remunerated at the wage ym, yet the miners have to incur the unit
commuting cost of ð1  dvÞ to reach the mining company from their initial
location, where dv is the distance of conflict from the location of the mine. An
individual k located at a distance dk from the mine prefers working in the mining
sector instead of farming if ym5yf þ ð1  dvÞdi. Notice that the proximity of
conflict to the mining sites increases the commuting cost for miners, thereby
reducing their net wage.
The incumbent maximizes his payoff with respect to three choice variables: (i)
the number of miners xm; (ii) the amount of soldiers to deploy against the
challenger, xi, given the exogenous unit cost y of the soldiers
11; and (iii) the
location of its army, dv, given an increasing and convex deployment cost cðdvÞ.12
We describe the probability that the incumbent beats the challenger by the function
pðxi, xc, dvÞ, with xc standing for the challenger’s number of soldiers, and the
fighting technology satisfying some very general assumptions:
pðxi, xc, dvÞ ¼ gðxiÞeðdvÞ
eðdvÞgðxiÞ þ gðxcÞ , g
0ðxjÞ > 0, g 00ðxjÞ, e0ðdvÞ, e00ðdvÞ < 0, j ¼ fi, cg
The probability that the incumbent is victorious in a confrontation with the
challenger is assumed to depend positively on the incumbent’s army strength
gðxiÞ, and on his relative fighting efficiency eðdvÞ, whereas it is a negative
function of the challenger’s strength gðxcÞ. Moreover, we are assuming that the
incumbent’s relative fighting efficiency is the highest when his troops are
deployed close to the incumbent’s headquarters and that this fighting efficiency
is monotonically decreasing in dv.
Notice that deploying the army farther from the mines has three effects: first, it
decreases the cost of labour (as it increases the net wage offered to miners); second,
..........................................................................................................................................................................
11 Making the fighters’ remuneration endogenous would unnecessarily complicate the model. Indeed,
having assumed that the pool of workers is not influenced by the number of fighters recruited, the
endogenous remuneration of the latter would simply amount to a rescaling of our results.
12 All results remain qualitatively unchanged if the deployment cost is linear.
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it increases the costs of deployment, c dvð Þ; and third, it reduces the efficiency of
fighting of the army, as soldiers have to patrol a larger territory.
The utility of the incumbent is therefore given by:
ui ¼ pðxi, xc, dvÞðxm, dvÞ  yxi  c dvð Þ ð3Þ
Since the labour force, x, has two occupational choices and the commuting cost, ,
is incurred by the workers, it follows that for a mining wage ym, any individual lying
on the interval ½0, dm prefers mining to farming, where dm is defined as:
dm ¼ ym  yf
ð1  dvÞ
We thus have the mining labour supply as follows:
xsm ¼
ymyf
ð1dvÞ if
ymyf
ð1dvÞ41
1 otherwise
(
It then follows that the inverse labour supply function is given by:
ym ¼
xmð1  dvÞ þ yf if xsm41
ð1  dvÞ þ yf otherwise

We can now write the incumbent’s maximization problem as follows:
max
xm, dv , xi
gðxiÞeðdvÞ
eðdvÞgðxiÞ þ gðxcÞ ’ðxmÞ  xmð1  dvÞ  yf
 
nxm  yxi  cðdvÞ
 
ð4Þ
Optimizing yields the following first-order conditions:
@ui
@xm
¼ pðxi, xc, dvÞn ’ðxmÞ  yf þ ’0ðxmÞxm  2ð1  dvÞxm
  ¼ 0 ð5Þ
@ui
@dv
¼ e
0ðdvÞgðxiÞgðxcÞ
ðeðdvÞgðxiÞ þ gðxcÞÞ2
ðxm, dvÞ þ pðxi, xc, dvÞnx2m  c0ðdvÞ ¼ 0 ð6Þ
@ui
@xi
¼ g
0ðxiÞgðxcÞeðdvÞ
ðeðdvÞgðxiÞ þ gðxcÞÞ2
ðxm, dvÞ  y ¼ 0 ð7Þ
We show in the supplementary material that the incumbent’s utility function is
quasi-concave in the decision variables.
The challenger’s optimization problem is analogously given by:
max
xc
gðxcÞ
eðdvÞgðxiÞ þ gðxcÞðxm, dvÞ  yxc
 
ð8Þ
Optimizing gives the following first-order condition:
@uc
@xc
¼ g
0ðxcÞgðxiÞeðdvÞ
ðeðdvÞgðxiÞ þ gðxcÞÞ2
ðxm, dvÞ  y ¼ 0 ð9Þ
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It is straightforward to show that the challenger’s objective function is concave
in xc.
Having shown that the problem is well behaved, we can deduce that a Nash equi-
librium for this game exists (see Mas-Colell et al., 1995, proposition 8:D:3).
Moreover, by combining eqs (7) and (9), we can deduce that g 0ðxiÞgðxcÞ ¼
g 0ðxcÞgðxiÞ, and since gð:Þ is a concave function it is necessary that xi ¼ xc.
Equipped with these results, we can now conduct comparative statics on the
parameter of interest.
4.1 Comparative statics
Using eq. (5) and by the Implicit Function Theorem we can derive the following
expression:
dxm
dn
¼  pðxi, xc, dvÞ@ðxm, dvÞ=@xm
@2ui
@x2m
ð10Þ
The numerator is nil, as it equals the first-order condition in eq. (5) up to a
multiplicative term n. Because the number of concessions n linearly affects the
profitability of mining, changing the number of the mining concessions does not
affect the optimal number of miners: both the marginal cost of hiring an additional
worker, and his marginal return for the company are unaffected by the increase in
n. This does not mean, however, that the industry has not become more profitable,
rather, the incumbent will see his profits increase proportionally to the number of
mines he controls.
Proceeding likewise with condition (6) we obtain:
ddv
dn
¼ 
pðxi, xc, dvÞ e
0ðdvÞgðxcÞ
eðdvÞgðxiÞ þ gðxcÞðxm, dvÞ=nþ x
2
m
 	
@2ui
@d2v
> 0 ð11Þ
Using the first-order condition in eq. (6), we deduce that the numerator of eq. (11)
is equal to expression (6) to which we substract its third term and divide the whole
expression by n, thus implying that the numerator of eq. (11) is positive and that
@dv=@n > 0.
The net effect of an increase in the number of concessions on the optimal
location of conflict is the result of two opposing forces. On the one hand the
incentives to protect a resource that has become more valuable are higher, thus
pushing the incumbent to wage conflict further from the mining location so that
the mining activity is less disrupted. On the other hand, however, the same force
induces the incumbent to reduce the distance of combat to the mine so that his
troops’ efficiency is enhanced. Eventually, since the marginal cost of troop
deployment is unaffected by an increase in the number of mining sites, it follows
that the marginal benefit from moving the conflict further from the mining
location outmatches the marginal cost in terms of forgone fighting efficiency.
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Finally, we can derive the effect of a change in n on the intensity of conflict by
using eq. (7):
dxi
dn
¼  g
0ðxiÞgðxcÞeðdvÞ
ðeðdvÞgðxiÞ þ gðxcÞÞ2
@ðxm, dvÞ=@n
@2ui
@x2i
> 0 ð12Þ
The sign of this expression is as expected, since the marginal benefit of additional
soldiers on the ground follows the increase in mining profits, whilst the marginal
cost of this operation remains unchanged. As a consequence the incumbent will
deploy more troops, and given the strategic complementarity between the forces of
the incumbent and those of the challenger, the latter will equally deploy more
troops at equilibrium.
5. Revisiting the empirical analysis
Our theoretical model suggests that the impact of mining concessions on conflict is
non- homogeneous across space. In particular, increasing the number of mining
sites has the potential not only of increasing overall conflict intensity but also of
displacing violent events further from mineral deposits. Anecdotal evidence in
support for this thesis abounds. The weak state capacity in most of the DRC
enabled armed groups, including the FADRC, to profit from minerals not only
through direct looting but also by granting protection to mining sites in exchange
for a participation to the mining industry’s profits (Fessy, 2010; Spittaels, 2010;
Raeymaekers, 2010; de Koning, 2011; Verweijen, 2013). This military-turned-
businessman formula has been shown to improve local governance (Raeymaekers,
2010; Sanchez de la Sierra, 2013), echoing the works of Gambetta (1993) on the
business-promoting consequences of the Sicilian Mafia. According to these accounts,
a displacement of violence occurred at times where armed groups would focus their
attention on the protection of a particular mining location (Rudahigwa, 2010; UN
Presidential Statement S/2010/596, 2010; de Koning, 2011). The following quote
from de Koning (2011, p.26) is particularly illuminating:
Clearly the controlling military actor stands to gain by establishing a minimum
level of stability in which miners and traders can operate. [. . .] In this, these actors
either mimic the operations of private businesses or operate in partnership with
them, offering means of production and transport, as well as a degree of
protection. [. . .] Finally, when driven by economic interests, FARDC troop de-
ployments focus on major mines and trading centres, leaving smaller mines and
communities vulnerable to looting by armed groups. According to the UN Group
of Experts, a number of villages in Walikale that were looted and where mass rapes
took place in early July 2010 had no security presence because FARDC units in the
area were competing for control of the Bisie mines.
A recent study of Sanchez de la Sierra (2013) provides micro-founded evidence that
rises in mineral prices incentivize armed groups to better protect and tax at the
local level in eastern DRC, hence unveiling a sort of proto-state building. Such
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decentralized development of state capacity is fully consistent with our own theory
that we next attempt to highlight by incorporating the spatial dimension in the
econometric analysis.
A first empirical indication of such spatial dependency is given in Table 5. The
Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests performed in columns (1) to (3) of Table 5 suggest
significant spatial lags and error correlations at the territory level.
To explicitly assess the importance of spatial spillovers, we consider two models.
First, we assess the role of spatially lagged mineral concessions, following Florax
and Folmer (1992). We apply the method to our panel analysis following Anselin
(2002). We augment eq. (2) with a spatially lagged explanatory variable in the
following way:
Conflictsi, t ¼ i þ t þ 1 dConcessionsi, t þ 2 dWConcessionsi, t
þ 3Rainfalli, t þ i, t
Concessionsi, t ¼ 0i þ 0t þ 1PriceIndexi, t þ 2WPriceIndexi, t
þ 3Rainfalli, t þ 0i, t
WConcessionsi, t ¼ 00i þ 00t þ 	1PriceIndexi, t þ 	2WPriceIndexi, t
þ 	3Rainfalli, t þ 00i, t
ð13Þ
We use a distance-based spatial matrix based on the inverse distance decay function.
WConcessionsi, t and WPriceIndexi, t are weighted sums of the concession-based
variables and price indices at other locations. We can, for instance, express the
variable WConcessionsi, t as follows:
WConcessionsi, t ¼
X
j 6¼i
wijConcessionsj, t where wij ¼
dijP
j
dij
Where  takes the values 1 or 2 as these are the most common integers used in
spatial econometrics (Anselin, 2002).
Second, we also estimate spatial panel models with time and location fixed effects
using Matlab routines and methods developed by Elhorst (2003, 2010). The
estimation approach includes the bias correction procedure proposed by Lee and
Yu (2011) for spatial panel data models containing spatial and/or time-period fixed
effects. Because of the absence of convincing evidence of the presence of spatial
correlation at the district level, in addition to possible small sample bias with
respect to districts (just 38), we discuss only territory-level estimates.
Estimating the system of eq. (13), Table 6 indicates that at the territory level the
granting of mining concessions in the neighbouring territory significantly increases
the risk of conflict (especially violent conflicts). The coefficient of the non-spatially
lagged variable is negative and significantly different from zero. Table 6 indicates
that these results are robust to the use of an alternative spatial matrix of order 1,
instead of 2 (regressions (3) and (4) in Table 6). In regressions (5) and (6) of
Table 6, we report estimation results using explicit spatial models for panel data
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based on the methods developed by Elhorst (2003, 2010), along with the bias
correction procedure proposed by Lee and Yu (2010) for spatial panel data
models containing spatial and/or time-period fixed effects. The results suggest
the existence of significant spillovers in conflict intensity in both the error term
and the spatial dependent variable. In other words, conflicts erupting in territories
are not independent from each other; consequently, any strategy to address these
conflicts should be comprehensive and inclusive. Even with these spatial
Table 5 Lagrange Multiplier tests for spatial correlations
Level of analysis Territory
.....................................................
District
.....................................................
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Conflicts Violent conflicts Conflicts Violent conflicts
(Log) Concessions
Spatial lag 73.69*** 73.69*** 3.2 3.8
Spatial error 73.49*** 73.49*** 2.7 3.4
Note: ***p< 0.01.
Table 6 Results with spatial dependency
Order of Spatial Matrix 2
....................................
1
................................................................................
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Conflicts Violent
conflicts
Conflicts Violent
conflicts
Conflicts Violent
conflicts
(Log) Concessions 0.542** 0.404* 0.911** 0.737** 0.93*** 0.780***
(0.276) (0.234) (0.416) (0.363) [8.203] [7.408]
(Log) neighbouring
concessions
3.337*** 3.105*** 2.367*** 2.175*** 2.535*** 2.255***
(1.102) (1.009) (0.794) (0.740) [12.828] [12.278]
Spatially lagged dep. var. 0.103*** 0.094***
[8.96] [8.145]
Spatial error correlation 0.282*** 0.295***
[12.72] [12.76]
Rainfall anomalies 3 3 3 3 3 3
Rainfall anomalies2 3 3 3 3 3 3
Territory FE 3 3 3 3 3 3
Year Month FE 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 19,800 19,800
Root MSE 1.147 1.072 1.357 1.248
Underid test 19.7*** 19.7*** 15.31*** 15.31***
Log Likelihood 502 476
Territories 150 150 150 150 150 150
Notes: ***p¡ 0:01, **p¡ 0:05, *p¡ 0:1; Robust standard errors in parenthesis; asymmetric T-statistics in
brackets.
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specifications, our estimates remain very stable. Based on regressions (6) of Table 6
and given the mean number of conflict events reported in Table 1, a 10% increase
in the number of mining concessions would respectively decrease the likelihood of
conflict events by about 60% in the same territory. However, a similar increase in
the number of the concessions would also increase the number of conflicts by about
165% in the neighbouring territory. At the district level, no spatial effect is found.
As in Section 3.3, results are robust to alternative definitions of the mining con-
cessions and conflict variables and to subsample analyses.
Overall, these results are consistent with the theoretical predictions that a larger
number of mining sites increases the protection effect, thereby reducing violence
around the mine(s); gives the incentives to the incumbent to move the conflict
location farther from the mining site (potentially in a neighbouring territory); and
results in a higher level of violence at the aggregate level (adequately captured at the
district level). Although caution is usually called for when interpreting spillover
effects as causal (Corrado and Fingleton, 2011), the theoretical model developed in
the previous section supports such interpretation and allows us to go beyond purely
data-analytic considerations. Our results are therefore supportive of the spatially
based theoretical mechanisms proposed in the previous section and are likely to
explain what appeared to be an ecological fallacy in Section 3.3. In other words, the
absence of a statistically significant relationship between mining concessions and
(violent) conflicts at the territory level in our baseline regression is driven by an
omitted spatial effect, explained by the incumbent’s incentives to protect the
mining business. When spatial spillovers are taken into account, a mining
concession tends to decrease the risk of conflict in the same territory but
increases the risk in neighbouring territories. That in turn explains why a change
in the number of concessions would translate at a more aggregated effect (that is,
the district level) into an increase in conflict intensity.
6. Alternative explanations
In interpreting our empirical results we propose an explanation based on the
incentives of extractive companies to protect their business. How does our
‘protection effect’ mechanism perform against alternative explanations?
Several alternative explanations are compatible with natural resource wealth
having a nonsignificant effect on conflict at the very local level and a significant
and substantial effect at a higher level of aggregation. The first relates to measurement
errors and the potential lack of within-territory variation. Conflict events may be
measured with more noise at the territory level as underlying sources may be less
accurate about the precise territory in which the event takes place. This would
generate relatively larger standard errors in our analysis at the territory level. We
cannot completely rule out this explanation. However, repeating the analysis with the
two most commonly used geo-referenced data set on conflict (ACLED and UCDP)
does not affect our findings. Moreover, this criticism would likewise invalidate a
substantial share of recent conflict studies which moved the focus of the analysis
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to more disaggregated geographic levels. We also argue that the ecological fallacy
cannot be explained by a difference in variations between the two samples. First, our
findings in Section 5 show that there is enough variation at the territory level to
efficiently estimate the relationship of interest, provided the specification is in line
with the theoretical mechanism linking mineral concessions and conflicts. Second,
implementing an analysis of variance on the two samples suggests that the within-
territory variation is actually larger than the within-district one.
Second, it could still be asserted that the ecological fallacy results from the too
restrictive nature of the territorial boundaries that forbids us to identify the rela-
tionship between mining activities and conflict and capture the relationship
between any unobserved variable and conflict. The use of territory/district fixed
effects overcomes such criticisms. Unobserved factors linked to both conflict and
mineral concessions may, however, change over time in a different way at the
territory or district levels. That could explain why aggregation at the district level
yields different results than at the territory level. That would also lead to the
misleading interpretation that has been given to spatially lagged variables
(Corrado and Fingleton, 2011). Using socio-economic data from Demographic
Health Survey from 2007 (endogenous to conflict), we compare territories (or
districts) whose number of conflict events or mineral concessions lies above the
sample average, versus the others: conflict-prone areas have higher shares of
illiterate people, whilst relatively minerals-rich areas have better access to services
(e.g., running water and electricity) and have slightly higher wealth indices. Most
important, however, there is no systematic differences between the territory and the
district levels, suggesting that the restrictive nature of the territorial boundaries
cannot be the feature driving the ecological fallacy (results are reported in the
Supplementary Material).
Third, it is possible that we are capturing at the territory level alternative cen-
trifugal forces to the ‘protection effect’ proposed in the theoretical model. One such
possibility would be that mining activities are expanding next to existing mining
locations, yet moving across territorial boundaries. This could not explain the
negative coefficient obtained for the granting of concessions in the same
territory, but it could explain the conflictive impact on neighbouring territories.
We address this concern and do not find any evidence of such a centrifugal
expansion of concessions: the number of historical concessions is strongly
associated with the total number of concessions granted between 1997 and 2007
but not with the total number granted in neighbouring territories (results are
reported in the Supplementary Material).
Fourth, the presence of valuable minerals may translate into a higher opportunity
cost for armed group potential recruits, thereby generating a pacifying effect at the
local level. This is an appealing theory, well established in the conflict literature.
There are a number of reasons we do not believe opportunity cost to be the
mechanism driving our results. First, it cannot account for the increase in
conflict generated by minerals in neighbouring territories (effect highlighted in
Table 6). Neither is it consistent with the reality of DRC conflicts, where many
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of the armed factions were substantially composed by foreigners (Vlassenroot and
Raeymaekers, 2004; Prunier, 2009). Finally, even if local recruitment was affected by
mining activities, the opportunity cost channel cannot explain the location of the
violence: irrespective of the area of recruitment, why would the fighting occur at a
certain distance from the mining site?
Next, expanding mining activities may displace farmers by taking over lands
previously used for agricultural purposes. Displaced farmers might move into
neighbouring territories and join armed groups if alternative economic activities
are not available. We cannot exclude a displacement of farmers taking place,
following the granting of new mining concessions. If minerals were an important
factor in the violence experienced in DRC (as argued here and in a variety of
historical accounts), however, this mechanism fails to explain why conflict is
located far from the mining sites.
7. Conclusion
We explore the mineral resources—conflict nexus by focussing on the mineral-rich
and conflict-ridden DRC from 1997 to 2007. Using geo-referenced data, we inves-
tigate whether the DRC government’s granting of mineral concessions in particular
geographical areas has had an effect on the intensity of conflict. To overcome
endogeneity concerns, we instrument concessions granted over the period of
analysis by the interaction of historical concessions with the prices of mineral
resources. Our study reveals what appears to be a case of ecological fallacy: at
the territory level, granting concessions does not affect the level of conflict; at
the district level, however, the right to exploit mineral wealth is shown to
exacerbate the level of violence.
To rationalize this finding, we set up a theoretical model that relies on the
incentives of violent entrepreneurs to protect the mining activities by avoiding
armed confrontations with competing armed groups nearby the mining activity.
Securing a peaceful environment close to the mining sites enhances the mining
labourers’ security, thereby reducing the cost of the labour force for the company
that controls the mining location. A larger number of mining sites in a particular
geographical location is shown to increase the intensity of conflict and provoke a
displacement of conflict to more remote locations.
By incorporating the spatial dimension in the econometric analysis, we are able
to demonstrate that a displacement of violence is indeed taking place as a conse-
quence of the granting of mining permits, hence providing evidence that is
supportive of our theoretical mechanism. Increases in the granting of mining con-
cessions in a neighbouring territory significantly increase the risk of conflict.
Moreover, the granting of mining concessions in a particular territory is shown
to decrease the level of violence when we account for such spatial effects.
Our article therefore brings forward a crucial element in the understanding of the
roots of conflicts, namely, the importance of the geographical unit of observation.
Neglecting the spatial dimension may misguide policies. Indeed, we have shown
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that natural resources may constitute a blessing for populations located in the
neighbourhood of mines since resource-greedy entrepreneurs will deploy means
to protect their source of income. The same resources, however, can be
characterized as a curse for the wider geographical area since the conflicts in sur-
rounding areas are likely to become more intense.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material is available online at the OUP website.
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